

Approved For Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000500040028-4

14 JAN 1971

COMIREX MAPPING, CHARTING AND GEODESY WORKING GROUP

Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 1D918
Pentagon

1000 - 1200 Hours, 8 January 1971

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(S) Files

PRESIDING

[Redacted]

Chairman

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MEMBERS AND ALTERNATES PRESENT

[Redacted]

Colonel John W. Park, Jr., Army
Mr. Gustave W. Wolf, Navy
Mr. Donald R. Holben, Air Force

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[Redacted]

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CONSULTANTS PRESENT

[Redacted]

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Mr. Perry Gilbert, TOPOCOM
Lt Colonel Richard M. Snowden, Air Force

[Redacted]

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Mr. Roy Fordham, USGS

[Redacted]

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NRO review(s)
completed.

GROUP 1 Excluded from Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

[Redacted]

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1. Purpose of Meeting:

[redacted] opened the meeting explaining only one item had been programmed for discussion in the meeting and this dealt with MC&G requirements and scheduling considerations for the remaining KH-4 missions. This subject was identified on Agenda forwarded to Members on 5 January 1971.

2. MC&G Requirements and Scheduling Considerations for KH-4 Missions.

a. General:

[redacted] to provide opening comments on the matter at hand. It was proposed to treat the remaining KH-4 missions in 2 parts. First, from the standpoint of positioning with the Doppler Beacon relating to the two remaining Doppler DISIC missions it was pointed out that this could be addressed judiciously at this time; secondly, the question of the feasibility of operating a partially or perhaps fully dedicated KH-4 mission toward fulfilling MC&G requirements should be discussed fully with the objective of setting forth what specific follow up action should be taken that could present the feasibility of such use of KH-4 systems. [redacted]

[redacted] and that all KH-4 systems would not necessarily be needed for backup for general intelligence requirements. Following brief discussion this approach was considered satisfactory.

b. Positioning:

[redacted] mentioned that in the way of background it was understood that NRO would be operating Mission 1113 around the middle of February with the Doppler Beacon and this was consistent with earlier planning. However, [redacted]

the NRO had advised informally that Mission 1114 with the Doppler Beacon was being scheduled in May or possibly later in June and that the question of whether Mission 1114 would operate at all [redacted]

[redacted] Accordingly the positioning requirements evaluation undertaken by DIA was along the line of what would be the impact if Mission 1114 were not launched. From the beginning, justification for Doppler DISIC missions was based on the positioning of targets for long range missiles and to provide needed control for the production of maps and charts. Because of JCS priorities the requirements provided NRO for the 1st 3 Doppler DISIC missions gave priority to targets in the Sino Soviet. Assuming reasonable success with target positioning it was intended to devote large percentages of the remaining two missions (1113 and 1114) to provide control for mapping and charting outside the Sino Soviet. The mapping and charting control work is not only for the current medium scale

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25X1D mapping and charting but also for the development of control data bases and interim large scale products. In the target positioning area we have obtained adequate coverage from Missions 1109, 1110 and 1112 to position all but 141 Category I targets of the original 1124 specifically identified for Doppler positioning. Based on the experience of these three missions, we can expect to obtain adequate coverage for approximately 35 additional targets from Mission 1113. This leaves approximately 100 targets remaining in the current list for which direct targeting materials would not be available

Also, related to the target positioning problem is the requirement for approximately 70 short range attack missiles (SRAM) targets and 180 Radar Significant Points (RSP). These points had been added as additional positioning objectives since the program was initiated. Many of these points can not be photographed by Mission 1113 since they do not fall inside the daylight area of this particular mission. Loss of Mission 1114 would have a significant impact in the area of mapping, charting and data base control support. It was expected that a large percentage of the frame photography for this particular mission could be devoted to satisfying these requirements since a large portion of the missile target positioning requirements would have been accomplished with the first 4 missions as will have been the case. There is an outstanding requirement for approximately 5 million square miles of Doppler controlled frame photography in support of small and medium scale mapping, data base preparation and large scale interim products. Based on past experience we expect to obtain not more than 1,000,000 square miles of adequate unique coverage from Mission 1113. As an example, approximately 2800 1:250,000 sheets cannot now be completed due to the lack of adequate coverage. This total includes areas that are programmed for production by the United States production agencies. As another example Air Force has a control requirement to support ONC compilation in high hazard areas. Our inability to more adequately position all the targets and obtain the anticipated coverage to date is the result of deficiencies of operation in Missions 1110 and 1112. In the 1110 Mission malfunction of the camera resulted in loss of at least 30% of the film while for Mission 1112 there was a mechanical failure approximately one-half way through the mission with the loss of 50% of the film.

25X1A c. Discussion on Positioning Aspects Based on Information Presented.

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Mission 1113 could possibly obtain more than 1,000,000 square miles of Doppler DISIC coverage - possibly 1½ million. [] mentioned that even though the 100 remaining Category I hard targets for Mission 1114 were scheduled he indicated that not more than 20% of the film of the DISIC camera could profitably be used against these 100 targets. [] commented that we should not overlook the Category II targets which presently were not hard targets but any one of which could be a hard target some day and that there were also some targets inside the 450 feet accuracy which could now be reduced to 250 feet since the Doppler was working so well.

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[] commented that the secondary targets would be kept in the requirement picture and some reasonable balance related in overall priority would be established for these targets in relation to control for worldwide mapping. In fact for Mission 1112 DIA had done detailed planning with NRO to optimize the DISIC film against the various priorities of targets and map-chart production areas. This will be done in greater detail with respect to Mission 1113. It was concluded that the information presented by DIA and the discussion should be included in the minutes in support of retaining Mission 1114. [] pointed out that if further action, making use of this substantive information, were needed he would take up the matter with the Chairman of COMIREX at the appropriate time.

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d. Dedicated KH-4 Missions for Mapping and Charting.

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[] mentioned that it was desirable to discuss this matter broadly at this time with the objective of concluding what specific action should be taken. It was recognized as too early to make judicious conclusions regarding dedicated or partially dedicated KH-4 missions for MC&G purposes but probably not too early to study the feasibility. CDR Bausch, DIA representative of ICRS, indicated that the current overall COMIREX view with respect to the KH-4 missions was that the remaining KH-4

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1113 - DISIC and Doppler

1117 - No DISIC, no Doppler

1114 - DISIC and Doppler

1115 - DISIC no Doppler

1116 -- No DISIC, no Doppler

Mr. Fordham of USGS commented on the use of KH-4 data on the large and medium scale topographic maps of the US. He mentioned that all useful data of the US had either been used or was now in work. The USGS had completed about 110 sheets and about 50 more were in work. There were 468 sheets of the US that USGS had hoped could be revised thru the continued availability of KH-4 data. He mentioned that the KH-4 material was working out very well and that the only problem was that the extent of coverage was considerably short of their expectations. It was agreed that the USGS should add their requirements to the overall requirement picture as pertains to expanded use of remaining KH-4 systems for MC&G purposes. [redacted] commented that we

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should study more carefully the obsolescence factor in looking at KH-4 coverage requirements. [] commented that NRO had done some planning

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[] Because of the non-geometric strip pan characteristics and the mono mode both the DoD and USGS felt that such coverage would contribute very little to MC&G needs. It was mentioned that it might be used for updating in isolated target areas. [] mentioned that use of remaining KH-4 systems in a partially dedicated manner would reduce the need [] for MC&G purposes. It was finally concluded that while there were many factors to be considered the MC&G community should proceed with studying the feasibility of using the remaining KH-4 systems partially dedicated to MC&G coverage. This would take the form of DIA working with the Military Departments to develop an appropriate requirements explanation to which would be added the requirement aspects of the USGS in the US. At the same time DIA would work with NRO to define limited analysis that could be made with respect to various levels of film usage - it was expected that analysis data made one year ago by NRO for gap filling would contribute a large part to such studies. In general it was recognized that a month to 6 weeks would be required to present an initial appropriate draft study.

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Chairman
COMIREX MC&G Working Group

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